COLLISION PREVENTION SYSTEMS IN SA: Comments & a perspective on IM’s article on collision avoidance systems “Now You See Me” by Kobus Blomerus.

The article “reviews the post Level 9 mandating in South Africa”. My take on the topic, considering it being “the most detailed dive … yet”, is that the primary focus must be the regulation at play and where the industry is relative to that.

The RSA TMM Regulations (8.10) were promulgated on 27 February 2015 after being developed since 2012/13. It is significant to note that while the regulation relates to CAS Level 9, it has very specific requirements. Whilst CAS Level 9 generally refers to auto slowdown and stop technology, as either defined by the end user(mine) or the supplier(s), the RSA TMM Regulations require Collision Prevention Systems (term derived from regulatory text) with very specific requirements. This is very significant for any review of the status of auto slowdown and stop products required by the South African mining industry. Considering that non-compliance to the regulations makes a mine break the law, and as mentioned, risking mine closure (Sec 54 of the MHSA). It is this difference between Collision Prevention Systems (CPS) and CAS L9 that causes substantial confusion with regards to RSA regulatory compliance status of CAS L9 products.  Whilst for international mines the RSA context may be less relevant, it is not the case for product suppliers playing in the local market.

The article states that EMESRT L9 intervention controls were expected to be mandated for some time. It is necessary to point out that the RSA regulations were promulgated in February 2015, prior to the existence of the EMESRT 9 Levels of Vehicle Interaction controls. In fact, the regulations were developed since late 2012 via the local tri-partite approach between industry, the DMRE and organised labour. If the intent of the regulations were ever to, only later on, add auto slowdown and stop requirements, those clauses would have been excluded initially and introduced in next revisions of the regulation. Suspension of the clauses was because of the tri-partite parties’ realisation that technology did not exist at the time for underground and surface diesel powered TMM. It is noteworthy that none of the clauses were suspended for electrically powered underground production machines.

It is important to note that South Africa did not mandate EMESRT L9 intervention controls, it promulgated collision prevention technology with very specific functional requirements. The regulations were always clear, the suspension of the auto slowdown and stop functionality was a timing issue only, to allow mines and suppliers time to develop products.

Knowing that many if not all suppliers will differ from my view, I will elaborate on the consideration that on 17 February 2024 it will be 9 years since the regulations were promulgated and there is still not a single product that conforms to the requirements. An EMESRT L9 auto slowdown and stop product does not have a set of requirements that is commonly required by any number of mines/mining companies. L9 requirements are either embedded as product features or mine requirements specifications. The emergence of the EMESRT collision avoidance guidelines on the RSA regulatory scene is rather unfortunate. If not for that, I am convinced that conforming products would have been available by end 2023.

Whilst the EMESRT approach could be appropriate for an evolutionary, non-regulatory environment, it does not really assist South Africa’s challenge. There are a few reasons for my position. South Africa regulated specific functionalities, whilst EMESRT provide general guidelines that give both suppliers and mines a lot of functional freedom. Whilst many or all CAS suppliers claim conformance to L9, it is meaningless since there is no ruler to measure against. In essence, L9 means what anybody wants it to mean, as long as it includes some auto- stop functionality. Furthermore, the EMESRT 9 level model created confusion in South Africa with the differentiating of L7, L8 and L9 being equated to sub clauses a, b and c of regulations 8.10.1.2 and 8.10.2.1 CAS suppliers were quick to sell mines CAS L7 products for regulatory compliance to 8.10.1.2 (a) and 8.10.2.1 (a) that did not include effective warning characteristics, whilst it did little more than providing distraction for TMM operators and desensitising them for “alarms”.  South African TMM regulations never intended CAS L7 or L8 or L9 systems, it intended and still require Collision Preventions Systems (CPS).

Local mines did not do themselves any favours either by simply jumping boots and all onto the EMESRT wagon. RSA regulations clearly state that CPS is required only where significant risk of TMM collisions exist. By blanketly installing CAS L7 products on all TMMs, mines by way of doing so, confirmed that those TMMs are all exposed to significant risk of collisions and hence would need to automatically be upgraded once the suspended clauses were uplifted. It is my experience that EMESRT CAS L7, L8 and L9 shifted the entire industry focus from its challenge to have CPS products developed in time for when the sub clauses will be uplifted.

It needs to be pointed out that the article’s position that “inspectors want to see tangible progress” …….to begin deployment, is far from the real situation. Inspectors want demonstration of compliance. They are caught between the devil and the deep blue sea, knowing that compliant systems are not available, yet knowing that a sec 54 (mine closure) for non-compliance will take mines out of business and result in the loss of thousands of livelihoods in an already jobless country. The reality is that neither TMM OEMs – that are the logical source of solutions- or collision warning and avoidance device (CxD) providers took their accountability to develop compliant products serious, all openly stating that they follow the EMESRT approach and not that of the Minerals Council South Africa’s MOSH.  It is noteworthy that the article states “The big equipment OEMs …………have some kind of offering now”…… To the best of my knowledge no TMM OEM other than one local one, have products that have been verified to conform to the MOSH CPS requirements.

It is unclear as to who provided International Mining (IM) with some of the information in the article. The section dealing with non-alignment of approaches, when inspectors are satisfied, and contradicting instructions, starts off with “IM also understands that it is not entirely clear cut at what point the DMRE becomes officially satisfied….” I have a fundamental disagreement with the notion that “the DMRE must become officially satisfied”. This, in my view, shows a lack of understanding of the legal approach in RSA. The DMRE never become officially satisfied with …. A mining rights holder has a legal obligation to comply with the law governing the health and safety of persons on that mine. It is unclear to me on what basis the DMRE can grant any mine an extension or an exemption. Consider the legal ramifications for such, not to think of the administrative nightmare to administer it. Through the Minerals Council South Africa, the Chief Inspector of Mines (CIoM) made it clear that no formal extension or exemption will be granted. Although, a concerned Minerals Council, initiated a member differentiated approach to the application of such, it was clarified by the CIoM’s office. This has also been communicated to individual mines when making submissions to the DMRE.

Probably the most problematic aspect of the article for me is the statement “there is no set blueprint for how to introduce the technology” and “non-alignment and conflicting requirements only add to development lead times ….”. Whilst the latter is of course true, my personal position on the first is exactly the opposite. In an unprecedented commitment to enable the quickest possible compliance, the Minerals Council South Africa funded a multi-million rand “Industry Alignment on TMM regulatory requirements special project” to develop exactly such a blueprint; a single set of requirements and a process to introduce it. The outcome of this work was published for free on the MOSH website (www.mosh.co.za/transport-and-machinery/documents) since early January 2022. The real issue is that CPS product suppliers pushed back against the requirements because they “complied” with CAS L9 and did not consider the set of MOSH technical documents to be valid. Even after numerous bi lateral and collective engagements between the Minerals Council project team and suppliers the requirements are still considered to be guidelines, meaning, we will choose what we want to comply with. The Mine Health and Safety Council (MHSC) as well as the Minerals Council have gone further and spent millions of rands to establish a testing capability, able to independently verify conformance to the requirements. I believe the Minerals Council South Africa needs to be acknowledged for this groundbreaking industry wide approach and based on my experience of the CPS challenge and the environment, I am convinced that it would have taken at least 10 more years for the South African mining industry to achieve compliance than it would, without this commitment. I do not see wide ranging compliance any time soon (2024) but I notice some progress towards acceptance. Recent direct support from the DMRE in the Northern Cape may further convince product suppliers to use the “blueprint” to ensure their products comply with requirements.

One of the things that I completely agree with the article on is the paragraph on the ISO21815-2 2021 interface standard. Whilst I could never -and still do not- understand why the international member companies of ISO, who developed the ISO 21815 standard do not want to implement it. I am encouraged by the recent resolution of the mines in the Northern Cape to make this version of the standard, together with a small number of additional criteria, the only acceptable interface standard for use. It boggles my mind that it is the local suppliers that are much more accepting of the standard, since the application of the standard reduces the need for bespoke configurations to be developed and maintained by CxD providers.  The power of the Northern Cape’s resolution is that it makes absolutely no sense for a supplier (TMM OEM or a CxD provider) to have products with differing interface standards and hence a quick convergence is expected.

Another thing that I agree with the article on, is the view that the Vehicle Dynamics Group (VDG)of the University of Pretoria (UP) is now the globally regarded gold standard for testing, not for CAS L9 but for CPS products. As a seasoned systems engineering practitioner, I know the value of verification (testing). I wondered, when reading the picture description on the side of the photo of the two haul trucks saying “Testing” if indeed it was testing as per the definitions of the Systems Engineering Body of Knowledge (SEBOK). Sufficient to say I have witnessed multimillion USD product decisions being made on “test” results where the “tests” were no more than demonstrations, whilst even a technology readiness level (TRL) 4 test at VDG would have provided scientific support for such decision, reducing commercial and safety risk significantly.  It is thanks to the VDG and the work of Dr Hamersma that South Africa have a testing capability for CPS products and thanks to the vision of the MHSC and the MOSH team to fund it. The testing has already proven many an overconfident CPS product salesperson wrong, while receiving multiple utterance of gratitude from software engineers. The proof is in the pudding. I quote from Dr Hamersma, “The test results, although encouraging, clearly show the lack of product maturity”. In my understanding he is saying the products do not conform to the requirements yet.

To sum up my perspective to what the situation is post “Level 9 mandating” in South Africa:

• There was never any doubt if the suspended clauses would be uplifted.
• South Africa regulated Collision Prevention Systems and not CAS L9
• Expectations from the DMRE are clear.
• A blueprint for requirements and implementation exists.
• A test capability against the blueprint exists.
• Embracing the ISO 21815 – 2, 2021 interface standard is still eluding us, but signs are positive.
• TMM OEM acceptance of their MHSA sec 21 liability is poor.
• OEM TMM CPS products are far from compliant.
• CxD products are maturing, but as of today I am not aware of one product supplier that has demonstrated that their product has passed verification against the blueprint.
• The DMRE is rightly frustrated.

I will end my comment by saying, if only the mines in South Africa could find a way to move CPS suppliers to embrace the MOSH CPS blueprint, develop conformant products that are independently verified by UP’s VDG, an IM article at the beginning of 2025 can report a very different situation.